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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction by virtue of this appeal being
transferred from the Supreme Court. Utah Code, 1953, Title 78, Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(j)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Did the district court err:
I.

(a) In initially declining to grant the appellant's cross-motion for
summary judgment on the undisputed facts?
(b) In interposing an implied covenant of "good faith and fair
dealing"?
(c) In rewriting the contract to contain a term that permission cannot
6

be "unreasonably" withheld?
II.

(a) In failing to grant a mandatory injunction as the only adequate
remedy for the continuing nuisance?
(b) In denying relief for a lack of perceived damages?

III.

Assuming arguendo, damages were appropriate, in awarding nominal
damages without giving appellant the opportunity to introduce
evidence of actual damages?

IV.

In failing to direct reimbursement of appellant's legal fees and
expenses?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The standard of review for motions for summary judgment, whereby the
court views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party, would be applicable to both parties as each
cross-moved for such relief and the district court found in part for each. As both
represented to the court no triable material issues of fact existed, no inference or
favoritism should be granted either.
The issue being one of law, the relevant language of the contract not being
ambiguous, this court reviews it for correctness, giving the trial courts construction
and findings no particular weight or deference. Cooper State Leasing v. Blacker

7

770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1989): Nielsen V. Neilsen 780 P.2d 1264 (Utah 1989);Holladay
Duplex v. Howells 47 P.3d 104 (UT App. 2002).
Had the district court applied controlling law and found for the appellant, its
failure to award attorney's fees is to be reviewed on the standard of an abuse of
discretion.
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal from a decision of the District Court, on cross-motions for
summary judgment. The issues involve enforcement of the Covenants, Conditions
& Restrictions (CC&Rs) of a community in which both parties reside on adjoining
lots. The controlling CC&R regarding "FENCES" requires the prior permission of
all adjoining property owners, of which the appellant is one. Appellees erected a
fence, on the common property lines, without the requisite consent. This action
was brought to enforce the applicable CC&R, requesting abatement of the nuisance
by the removal of the fence. The district court found in the alternative for each
party but essentially denied appellant injunctive relief or actual damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Subsequent to the appellant's submission of the original memorandum in
opposition to appellees' motion for summary judgment and in support of his crossmotion, with typographical errors (R. 123-126), appellant submitted a corrected
set of papers, essentially the same (R. 180-221). In this brief, all references will be
made to the corrected second set.

8

Each party expressly stated there are no material facts that are in dispute.
These facts are:
Appellant, appellees, and the Martins were contiguous neighbors in the
residential community of Ranch Place, Utah (R.2, 178). Ranch Place adopted and
filed CC&Rs, one of which governs "Fencing" (Sec. 7.5) (R.2). The final
sentence of said section makes permission from adjacent owners, prior to the
installation of a fence along common lot lines, mandatory (R.182).
The appellees met the first requirement by obtaining approval of the fence
design from the Architectural Committee of the HOA (R.95). Appellees failed to
comply with the second requirement, viz.; they did not obtain permission from two
of four adjacent lot owners, both of whom objected to the fence as built (R.2, 178179,181,183).
Appellees not only had constructive notice of the CC&Rs (R.185), but had
actual knowledge that consent of adjoining neighbors was required, prior to
installing their fence (R. 186-187, 256,257).
In appellant's four day absence and without prior notice (R.168 para. 6,
174), appellees erected a 300 ft. long, 3 tier log fence, over four feet high,
completely sided with wire mesh, enclosing a rear area of approximately 7700 sq.
ft. (R. 4,168,183). The fence virtually closed off the remaining open side of
appellant's triangular rear yard, (R.169).
9

There are no fences at any other homes on appellant's street or in the
vicinity of appellees' home (R. 170). The fence is much less than fifty feet from
appellant's dwelling (R. 168). Allegation 22 of the complaint, that the fence was
erected and existed in violation of the CC&Rs (R. 4) was admitted in paragraph 1
of appellees' Answer (R. 13).
The permission requirement is not ambiguous and is unconditional (R. 185).
It was never waived (R.189). The requirement of permission from adjoining
neighbors is presently being expressly set forth in all design approvals of the
Architectural Committee (R.192, 212).
Regarding other existing fences further away in Ranch Place, it has to be
concluded that they were erected with permission of adjacent neighbors, as no
objections to them were made (R.188). The testimony of the vice president of the
HOA (now president), Mr. Johnson, was that he knew of only one incident in the
community where a fence was erected without seeking the permission of the
adjoining owners (R.257 para. 15,112-113), and no one objected thereto.
Appellees, after the fact, in an attempt to excuse their violation, invoked a
"Variance" procedure. Such procedure was inapplicable as it is expressly limited
to issues of "design", CC&R 3.3 (R.183), which issue was not present (R.186,
Decision R.283). Appellant also noted additional legal objections fatal to such
"Variance" meeting, (R.192-193, 254-255,259). These were filed with the HOA
10

counsel prior to the meeting (R. 214-215). At the "Variance" meeting 64 members
voted in favor of the variance. No one voted in opposition, as urged by the
appellant, in protest to the illegitimate meeting, although appellant, Martin, and
many others were present. Neighbors also knew no vote at all, amounted to a vote
against, as appellees had the burden of getting sufficient votes (R. 254).
Even if the procedure were available, there are 228 lot owners in Ranch
Place and a vote of 64 in favor out of a membership of 228 (R.183, 253-254) did
not achieve the required majority of 115 (R. 191, 254).
Additionally, appellees violated the maximum height provisions set forth in
Sec. 7.5 (R.185, 95). Every one of the 43 fence posts exceeds four feet (R.265).
A violation of the CC&Rs is expressly deemed a nuisance and subject to
abatement by any other owner. (CC&R 10.1 (R.189).
DISTRICT COURT DECISION
The court essentially made three distinct rulings. First, the court found in
favor of the appellees based on its evaluation of the reasonableness of the
appellant's objection. It stated it may have ruled for appellant had it found the
reasons for appellant's aesthetic objections were more to its liking. Second, it held
the permission requirement was not a "design" element, which would be subject to
the variance procedure. Without any evidence in the record as to the actual
measurements of any other fences, appellees represented six (of the 228 home sites
11

in R anch Place) w ei e o v ei four feet (R 251 para. 3) Based on this, the district
enurl rmirlihlnl (lirtv w v\ i \ r n \ n In llio H( I A 'iiiil ;i nia|niil\ ol lis nu'inln.1! . oil
the height restriction.
In its third and final ruling; the district court found in the alternative, that if
its first two theories upon winch it based its opinion were incorrect, appellant was
enlitk'-il l' dijiiuiiies oi'onr ilwllin

l( denial counsel fees.

Sigiuficaiith llio lo\*"< - i" "' 'Decision R 282-2X4 I did nuiL Ilk1
following findings:
\

Feu properties in the parties5 immediate neighborhood are fenced.

ii It acknow ledged appellant's claim " .he would never have' bought
h is pi opei ty if lie believed his neignoors could erect an ddjwnnnr
thin/ o\ 01 hh uhjeiliuii *(K 2K \ i | HR; t't mt I tailul
appellant and his archil:^ '

.•

\l uii (lir \\u ( (linil (lie RMI yard

could not be fenced off without his permission, in deciding the type of
house lie would build (a rambler) and its location on the lot (R.169)].
C i \ppellai it had no notice of the construction of the fence until after
it was complete d
COMMEN rS ON DISTR IC I CO' t J R I 'S DECISION
The appellees5 application for the fence stated it was to contain their newlyacquired puppy (R.94). Besides their initial application, on several other occasions

thereafter (R.83, 194-195, 230) appellees gave as their reason for the installation of
the fence, the protection of their newly acquired puppy. Their statement that
appellant wanted to use the appellees' property to exercise his dog was only
belatedly asserted by the appellees after appellant objected to their fence. This
accusation was denied by appellant (R.194). In any event, such subjective excuse
was not a reason to violate the CC&Rs, as a matter of law. Appellees claimed
motivation for the fence is no more relevant than appellant's or the Martins
subjective reason for objecting to it.
If indeed there was any merit to appellees' contention that appellant's dog
trespassed on their rear lawn, they had other more appropriate remedies available
to them, both civil and criminal, none of which were pursued, i.e., action for
declaratory judgment, nuisance, injunction, trespass, etc. It is not justification, as a
matter of law, to violate the CC&Rs.
The court created issues where none existed and then made findings thereof
to try and justify its desired resolution, ignored non-disputed facts, and speculated
as to the result of situations that might occur in the future. It ignored that a
person's home being unique, monetary damages were not adequate and on its own
determined, there was no diminution in value of appellant's real estate, without any
evidence before it or the opportunity given to the appellant to introduce such
evidence.
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I In: u nil ( conjee! mi cil about the applicability of proxies. I here never were

petitions obtained by appellees ringinp doorbells throughout the neighbor!] o--- \
pitching their cause, without opportunity of appellant to be present or respond, and
asking residents to sign a paper long before a "Vari.an.ce" meeting was ever called,
MI i i o d c c o f (lii" ttieefittg scnl <
The record is devoid of an> statement

.
*-v

n delined <K
..«-.•

t(8).

.

r

announced and by what vote it favored one party or the other, Further; I lie
"Variance" vote could only count those present. Unlike other sections of the
C i..&Rs, voting by proxy was not authorized (R.190-191. 254 para, 9),
I'IK: IIKII" II I 11HIII's

subsequent statement that it would, not be unreasonable

proper* \ i- unpaired b> the installation of the fence, ignore/ \\v- -

*

:

^

the Martins' affidavit (R. i 79 para. 10). The district court necessarily and
erroneously found that the closing in of appellant's relatively small triangular rear
) at ci (R 169) w ith a I , 700 square foot pen close to in* home and deck, was not an.
interference \wfli IIH enjtn itienf am! ntlme ml Ins pmpah. ^ a iiulki ol l.iw.
The finding of "a dispute" as to whether Hn Marlins (>;ive iKTiiiiv u ir
inexplicable as appellees acknowledged they never sought nor obtained - no
Martins' permission and the Martins' affidavit expressly states they did not (R.i79,

para. 7). The district court questioned the reasonableness of appellant's failure to
give permission but never addressed the reasonableness of the Martins' objection.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A controlling CC&R in the community where appellant and appellees reside
was knowingly violated by appellees. The district court, interjecting an implied
condition of "fair dealings and good faith", accepted a disputed subjective excuse
for the violation. Such implied condition is inapplicable to the case at bar.
Although conflicting conclusions in a decision are abhorrent to the law, in
the alternative the court found that the appellant may have been entitled to a
summary judgment but erred in failing to grant injunctive relief to remedy the
continuing nuisance.
ARGUMENT
Point I A
THE DISTRICT COURT, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PROPERLY
GRANTED APPELLANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Restricting covenants constitute a binding and enforceable contract
(Brighton v. Ward 31 P.3d 594 (Utah 2002)) (Decision R.283).
If the restricting covenant is not ambiguous, the court's duty is only to make
application thereof to the evidence:
Holladay Duplex v. Howells 2002 UT App. 125,47 P.3d 104
15

Freem..:

'

3

Hayes v.Gibbb l u Li 54, lo9r.2d75i

Vi^V;

"Generally, unambiguous restrictive covenants should be enforced as
written

>wenson?. (supra, para.

11

^

"It is [this] court's duty to enforce

i »l (lie |Kiilies us expressed in the plain language of the
•• •*•• •- '-v hwnuti

l

' K"(;'uLiln

„ .. ; ^..

owners who purchase land in such developments ha\ •+.- d

"Piopcils
'h* 4

il'onv

such covenants against other owners who violate them."" (See Crimmins v.
Simonds 636 P. 2d 478, 479 (Utah Sup 1981)
"Where a purchaser has notice oi the restriction . .he ^ . \<\

le with

knowledge of (lie purpose

\. . c,

962. Adopted in Utah in Hayes \ iJ :hh< r ^nnr f '

».

"Persons who own property in a neighborhood subject lo lo&lnctive
covenants are entitled lo rely on the covenants according to their terms, e\en n
so::/J {;i me ncigjibors no longer desire their enforcement." Crimmins v Simonds
(supra, 481) See also Sw ei ison \ Ei ickson (supra)
There is no issue th.

l

.« ..

'

without the requisite permission after constructive and actual knowledge of its
controlling CC&R 7.5 requirement (R.186-187, 256-257).

Point IB
THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING WAS
MISAPPLIED.
The district court erroneously interjected a theory of an implied covenant of "good
faith and fair dealing". Under the facts of the case at bar, such principle is
inapplicable. It is foreign to the fundamental law of contracts that their terms can
be rewritten under the guise of applying such theory. This principle is summed up
on Corpus Juris at 17A CJS Sec. 346, pages 378-9 as follows.
".. .where a contract is clear and seemingly complete, the courts
will not and cannot revise, extend, or enlarge it by
implication... Furthermore, the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing cannot be used to imply an obligation which would
completely obliterate a right expressly provided by the written
contract; stated otherwise, the obligation of good faith and fair
dealing cannot be constructed so broadly as to effectively nullify
other express terms of the contract. Accordingly, the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not impose any duty
that is contrary to the express terms of the contract. A term which
the parties have not expressed is not to be implied merely because
the court thinks it is a reasonable term, or because the contract is
advantageous to one party and unjust to the other; and a person
may not be required to do what he did not promise, merely because
what he did promise was not sufficient to meet the requirements
of some real or supposed public policy."
Where there are no express covenants or promises in a contract, compelling
a party to act in a particular manner, ".. .there can be no implied covenants or
promises to do the same." Scare v. University of Utah 882 P. 2d 673 (1994). See:
Olympus Hills Shopping Center v. Smith's Food 889 P.2d 445 (Utah 1994).
17

A court, by interposing theories of implied covenants of good faith and fair
dealing in a o iihacl has iht1 poleitlial nfdislorlmi.' wed established piinuples of
contract law, which are not sustainable

Benibe N Fashion Center 771 1* ,\l 10" ^'

(Sup. Utah 1989), relating to termination of employment; Beck v. Farmers
Insurance Exchange 701 P.2d 795 (Sup, Utah 1985), relating to insurer's duty to
SL ; ; J U wlclliiiS.

- .•; ,contract for reai - , -

i . ..

4

•<, < ,.:i. '64), relating to a

i Ogden

he court's eqiut} powers do not permit it to fashion a remedy
•.' out reference \o the terms of the underl) nig transaction....
Although we sympathize with the trial judge's effort, to do equity;
that effort must fail for several reasons
/ v cutii t uucb jiui iu: . vji ic oiaiiene io refoin
transaction
to include terms thai it believes are fair. Its discretion is narrowly
bounded. Reformation may be appropriate where both parties were
mistaken as to a term of the contract, or where one party is mistaken
and the other partv is <nnltv of inequitable condi ict "

The covenant of good faith does not "
duties

IIDI

establish new independent rights or

agreed upon by the parties, nor may the covenant be used to nullify a

(Referring to Brihaj

. . .: .. i-= -*..*»

.

:

Farm Bureau 19 P.3d 392 (Ct. of App. 2001); See also Rio Algoni (\w\\

In

{

Ltd., 618 P.2d 497 (Sup. Utah 1980); Malibu Investment v. Sparks 2000 Utah 30,
996 P.2d 1043; Howe v. Professional Manivest, 829 P.2d 160,163 (Utah 1992).
Express covenants relating to a specific contract right exclude the possibility
of an implied covenant of a different or contradictory nature, Ted R. Brown v.
Carnes 753 P.2d 964. (Utah Ct. of App. 1988)
In order to find bad faith and unfair dealings in a contractual relationship,
there must be circumstances to establish that one party did something substantial to
prevent the other party from performing its obligations (Zions Properties, Inc. v.
Holt 538 P.2d 1319 (Utah Sup. 1975). As a matter of law, appellant cannot be held
to have prevented appellees from obtaining the requisite permission that was never
even requested of him or the Martins. Had the appellees made such a request,
there was a likelihood that something could have been worked out.
It appears the district court strained to apply the theory of good faith and
fair dealing to try and arrive at what it perceived to be the popular position
reflected in the abortive variance vote. This was the result of false publicity and
door-to-door personal canvassing by appellees around the neighborhood, which
depicted appellant as the villain for his reliance upon the CC&Rs. This influenced
many residents of the neighborhood, the great majority of whom were unaffected
by the fence.
On the subject of interpretation of language as creating conditions or
19

[Minimises, tin1 Itiillimn ing is sl.ilul in W illiston on Contracts, Fourth edition, Sec.

km eve?. JI- un jrpretation cannot be employed as a means of
reducing the risk of forfeiture under a contract if the occurrence of
the event as a condition is expressed in unmistakable language. The
parties are entitled to the benefit of their bargain, and the mere fact
it turns out to have been a bad bargain for one of the parties does not
justify, through artful interpretation, changing the clear meaning of the
parties5 ^ vri.."
I h c d N i u l m i n i s division nuki's no i d b n i t r in ;m> hhMrli h\ iippdliinl

of any specific contractual obligation. It cannot be said appellant did anivf hint1 ir
failed to do anything regarding the fence except fail to give his permission for its
installation along the remaining open side of his triangular rear property line, the
other side alreau. ..... i,.r ;,een previous obstructed b\ a Mi>eu uiiu be. m i
trees a nd plant - •
circumstances, wln^u uppcncr: K- ! * -

.
^iv •

...n

i

dealings or lack of good faith.
" A duty of good faith does not mean that a party vested with a
clear right is obligated to exercise that right to its own detriment
for the purpose of benefiting another party to the contract. A court
will not enforce asserted rights that are not supported by the contract
itself (citation)"5 Rio Algom Corp. v Jimco 1 td 618 P ?H 497, 505

Utah's position is in keeping with the majoritj of ji irisdicti 3iis v* - hi : li
decline to find a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
absent a breach of an express term of a contract. Burger King v. Weaver 169 F.3d
2:

1310, 11th Circuit 1999, applying Florida law, (Cert, dismissed), 528 U.S. 948;
Griffith v. Levi Straus 85 F.3d 185, 5th Circuit 1996 (applying Texas law); Amoco
Oil v. Ervin 908 P.2d 493 (Colorado 1995). The duty of the Court is to declare the
meaning of what is written in the instrument and not what it feels the language
should have been. It is settled law when, without fraud or mistake, the written
contract expresses the obligations of the parties. Such writing is not only the best
but the only evidence of their agreement. Hicks v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co. 182
Oklahoma 61, 76 P.2d 269 (Sup. 1938); Shiver v. Liberty Building-Loan Assn. 16
Cal 2d 296, 106 P.2d 4 (Sup. 1940).
It cannot be questioned that appellant was given the right to withhold his
consent. Appellant had no contractual obligation to do or perform anything
regarding the appellees' fence other than approve or disapprove it, if and when he
was asked to give permission.
"We will not interpret the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
to make a better contract for the parties than they made for
themselves, Rio Algom v Jimco (supra)..." Brown v. Moore 973 P.2d
950 (Sup. Utah 1998)
See also U. S. Pipe and Foundry v. American Arbitration
Association, 67 N.J. (Sup. Ct. 384,170 A.2d 505 (New Jersey 1961)
Point IC
THE DISTRICT COURT IMPERMISSIBLY REWROTE
THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT
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Based upon its erroneous conclusion that the covenant oi good faith and fair
dealing is applicable (IK » mnl lc-ipli'<»M,ACH In m^nnl ilie rnnii u ( hrhn i m Ill >
pai ties. After the term, ".. .permission for the fencing shall be obtained from the
adjacent Owner prior to installation", it altered the clear language by in effect
adding, "Sue \ pji n\isMon cannot be unreasonably withheld "
\A o\ isions oi the cC&Rs allow .an exception to the
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unambiguous contract between the parties to condition the times when permission
can be withheld and when it cannot _Yii example oi' this is when the district court
engaged in evaluating the extent of aesthetic interference and the reasonableness of
api^-iiam s objection.

the parties, would be unwise or even operate unjustly. Chemical Construction
Corp v. Continental Engineering 407 F.2d 989 (CA Ala); Conservative Federal
Savings & Loan Assn. v. WarnecU
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"Hence, in order that an unexpressed term may be implied,
the implication must arise from the language employed in the
instrument or be indispensable to effectuate the intention of
the parties...

1u8

Accordingly, there can be no implication as against the express
terms of the contract; and the courts will be careful not to imply
a term, where the subject matter is completely covered by the
contract or as to which the contract is intentionally silent."
17ACJSSec. 34, pg. 378-9
Where language is clear, "(t)he policy favoring freedom of contract
requires that, within broad limits, the agreement of the parties should be honored,
even though forfeiture results." Oppenheimer & Co., v. Oppenheim, Appel 86
N.Y. 2d 865, 660 N.E. 2d 415,636 NYS 2d 734 (Court of Appeals-New York
1995); Restatement (Second) of Contracts 229, page 185, comment A.
"We also disagree with the trial judge's conclusion that plaintiff
breached an implied covenant of the lease by unreasonably
withholding its consent to defendant's use of the washing machine.
Initially we note that the record does not contain any indication that
defendant sought such permission. If authorization was not requested
then it could not have been unreasonably withheld. Moreover, a
covenant in a lease can arise by implication only from some specific
language of the lease or because it is indispensable to carry into
effect the purpose of the lease. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130,
143, 265 A.2d 526 (1970). The language of the subject lease is
not ambiguous and thus does not give rise to any implication
because of a required construction. It clearly and simply says
that no washing machines may be installed by the tenant without
the advance authorization of the landlord. To interpret such
provision as meaning the landlord's permission would not be
unreasonably withheld would amount to an impermissible
rewriting of the lease agreement.
See Brower v. Glen Wild Lake Co., 86 N.J. Super. 341, 346
(App. Div. 1965), certif. den. 44 N.J. 399 (1965)."
Housing Auth. Of City of E. Orange v. Mishoe, 493 A.2d 56, 201 N.J. Super. 352
(1985) (Appellate Division).
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Point IIA
THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED ITS EQUITABLE
POWERS TO RESTORE THE PARTIES TO STATUS QUO
The violation was in fact and was deemed a continuing nuisance, CC&R
10.1 (R.207). Abatement thereof by a mandatory injunction was the only adequate
remedy. Stergios v. Forest Place HOA 651 S.W. 2d 396 (Tex. Ct. Appl. 1983).
The courts of Utah uniformly enforce violations of restrictive covenants in
subdivisions by permanent injunction. Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 478 (Utah
1981); Schick v. Perry, 12 Utah 2d 173, 364 P.2d 116 (1961); Leaver v. Grose, 610
P.2d 1262 (Utah 1080).
The breach of a restrictive covenant is an irreparable injury for which
damages are estimated only by conjecture. The unique nature of a person's home,
the interests of other lot owners in the subdivision and the integrity of the CC&Rs
demonstrate the inadequacy of money damages. In such cases, courts of this state
hold an injunction to be the only appropriate remedy to enforce covenants.
"Enforcement of real covenants has virtually been subsumed by the
modern practice of treating all covenants respecting land as equitable
servitudes. The reasons for this transformation are the appropriateness of
injunction remedies for the enforcement of property restrictions. ... The real
basis for the enforcement of equitable servitudes is the doctrine that one who
takes land with notice of a restriction thereon cannot in equity and good
conscience be permitted to violate that restriction. ... Equitable relief in the
form of an injunction is the usual means of enforcing an equitable
servitude..."
Thomas & Backman on Utah Real Property Law Sec. 1205 p. 546
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In Utah County v. Baxter 635 P.2d 61 (Sup. Utah 1981) dealing with a
zoning violation, the court held that a plaintiff need not make a showing of
irreparable injury to obtain an injunction. Violation of a community CC&R should
be treated no differently.
"As a general proposition, property owners who have purchased land
in a subdivision, subject to a recorded set of restrictive covenants and
conditions, have the right to enforce such restrictions through equitable
relief against property owners who do not comply with the stated
restrictions. See Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 478, 480 (Utah 1981)
5 Williston on Contracts, 669 at 154 3 ed.
The appellees have no standing to ask the court not to order removal of the
fence as it was not erected in good faith. They installed the fence after actual
knowledge that permission of all adjoining neighbors was required (R. 186-7,2567) never even requested the required permission of appellant and Martin and
erected it during the only few days appellant was out of town that summer (R.168).
"The defendant with full knowledge of the restriction deliberately
attempted to override them.. .He took his chances as to the effect
of his conduct with eyes open to the results which might ensue...
Entrenchments behind considerable expenditures of money
cannot shield premeditated efforts to evade or circumvent legal
obligations from the salutary remedies of equity."
Armstrong v. Leverone 136 A. 71,75-76 (Conn.1927)
Real estate being unique, courts will restore the parties to status quo before
the breach by directing the removal of the fence. The benefit of the doctrine of
balancing the equities or relative hardship is reserved for the innocent defendant
who proceeds without knowledge that he is violating the covenants. Where the
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encroachment is deliberate and constitutes a willful interference with another's
property rights, equity will require restoration to the prior status quo ".. .without
regard to the relative inconvenience or hardship that might result from its
removal." Papanikolas Bros. Enters v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assoc. 535
P.2d 1256, 1259 (3) (Sup. Utah 1975).

Point IIB
IN ENFORCING RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS
NOT WITHHELD FOR LACK OF PERCEIVED DAMAGES
This issue was specifically addressed in a decision of the Supreme Court of
Connecticut in the case of Hartford Electric Light Co. v. Levitz, 173 Conn. 15, 376
A.2D 381 (Sup. Ct. Conn. 1977). Therein the defendant objected to injunctive
relief unless there was substantial and irreparable injury.
After acknowledging the long line of authority supporting the general rule
that ordinarily irreparable and substantial injury must be threatened before an
injunction is issued, the court stated:
"These and many other similar cases have been examined, and in none of
them was an injunction which was sought to enforce a restrictive covenant
refused for the lack of a threat of substantial irreparable injury. Cases
involving enforcement of restrictive covenants show that in those actions a
different standard is applied to the request for an injunction.
"In Armstrong v. Leverone, supra, this court found no error in the granting
of an injunction against violation of a restrictive covenant against business
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use of certain property. It stated (p. 472) that "proof of special damage is
not necessary, and if the act of the defendant transgresses the restriction it is
a violation of the rights of the plaintiffs which is not dependent upon the
existence or amount of damage. Berry on Restrictions on Use of Real
Property, 413; Morrow v. Hasselman, 69 NJ. Eq. 612, 61 A. 369; Peck v.
Conway, 119 Mass. 546."
The Connecticut court also held that the defendant's substantial expenditures did
not make injunctive relief inequitable, because they were made willfully after
knowledge that he was violating the restrictions, to wit:
"When one has gone on wrongfully in a willful invasion of another's rights
in real property, the latter is entitled to have his property restored to its
original condition even though the wrongdoer would thereby suffer great
loss. It has been said that the result of denying a mandatory injunction in
such a case would be to 'allow the wrongdoer to compel innocent persons to
sell their rights at a valuation (citation).' "
"The fact that the damage suffered by plaintiffs as a consequence
of defendants' covenant violation was monetarily minimal does
not preclude plaintiff from obtaining an injunction in view of
plaintiffs' protectable interest in the residential integrity of their
neighborhood and the enforceability of the covenants that help to
sustain it. Liu v. Dunnigan, 25 Md. App. 178,333 A.2d 338 (1975);
Pavia v. Medcalfe, 45 Misc.2d 597, 257 N.Y.S. 2d 447 (1965),
aff d 26 A.D.2d 621,272 N.Y.S. 2d 716 (1966) [FN2]" See Crimmins v.
Simonds 636 P.2d 478, *480 (Utah, 1981).
In the case at bar, the court below indicated that it may have ruled in
appellant's favor if it found appellant's aesthetic reasons more to its liking or was
more impressed with appellant's claim of interference with his enjoyment of his
home. The cases hold it is not the court's prerogative to weigh the extent of the
perceived damage.
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In Fink v. Miller 896 P.2d 649 (Utah 1995), this court in discussing the need
for a showing of damages and the appropriateness of injunctive relief stated at 655,
FN8.f
"We also note that the trial court showed undue concern about the
issue of 'irreparable harm'. While the element of harm must be met
when considering the necessity for a temporary restraining order, see
Utah R. Civ.P. 65A(b) (1), it is not essential to the court's decision to
grant a permanent injunction to enforce a restrictive covenant. Property
owners have a protectable interest in enforcing restrictive covenants
through injunctive relief without a showing of harm. See Crimmins v.
Simonds (supra) at 480, Hagemann v. Worth, 56 Wash. App. 85, 782
P.2d 1072,1074 (1989); Morris v. Kadrmas, 812 P.2d 549, 554 (Wyo.
1991)."
Point IIC
ASSUMING ARGUENDO, DAMAGES WERE APPROPRIATE, NO
OPPORTUNITY WAS AFFORDED APPELLANT TO ESTABLISH THEM.
This matter involves cross motions for summary judgment. As is invariably
the case on motions for summary judgment, both sides directed their attention to
issues of liability. Damages were not addressed. It seems too fundamental to
require argument that if damages were the proper remedy, appellant should have
had an opportunity to introduce evidence of the same. This is not to suggest in the
case at bar that damages are adequate. The foregoing authorities establish, in cases
of restrictive covenants, injunctive relief is appropriate. If however, liability was
found and damages were to be awarded, a hearing should have been directed.
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The record established that appellees built this imposing corral fence along
appellant's rear property (R.183), closing off the only open remaining side of his
rear triangular yard (R. 169). The lower court nevertheless held that there was no
damage, or diminution of the value of appellant's home, as a matter of law. In
alternatively granting appellant summary judgment, it determined, without any
hearing, nominal damages of $1.00 to be fair compensation.
"...Thus, the Campbells are entitled to an opportunity to prove
that State Farm acted in bad faith and that, as a result, they suffered
damages..." Campbell v. State Farm 840 P2d 130,142. See also
Williams v. Barber 765 P.2d 887, 889. Hayes et al. v. Gibbs, et al.,
110 Utah 54 (1946), 169 P.2d 781.
Point III
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND LEGAL EXPENSES
Appellant's complaint requested legal fees. Based upon the district court's
erroneous conclusions, referred to herein, it declined to award appellant attorney
fees and disbursements. It is respectfully submitted that had the district court
applied controlling principles of law, attorney's fees would have been appropriate
as provided in CC&R Sec. 10.2 (R.4).
It is clear that it was a disregard by the appellees of the known CC&Rs that
precipitated the events and proceedings culminating in this appeal. They chose not
to discuss the contemplated fence with appellant or the Martins before erecting it
and did it clandestinely in appellant's four day absence. The appellant did nothing
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but exercise his right to object to this imposing fence after he was shocked to find
it upon his return. In addition to his non-compensable time and effort, appellant
has sustained thousands of dollars in legal fees and expenses seeking redress. To
deny him reimbursement under such circumstances was an abuse of discretion.
".. .However, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that 'a court has inherent
equitable power to award reasonable attorney fees when it deems
appropriate in the interest of justice and equity."'
Stewart v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994).
Courts use their equitable power to award attorney fees where a party
has acted in bad faith. Rohan v. Boseman 445 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 2002 UT
app 109 46 P.3d 753. See also Cafferty v. Hughes 445 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,
2002 UT app 105. In the case at bar the CC&Rs expressly provide for them.

CONCLUSION
The provision on "Fencing" was clear and known constructively and
actually.
The related history of the provision, when being adopted, was a compromise
between one faction who wanted no fencing and those who were in favor of
unrestricted fencing. The resolution was that a homeowner could erect fencing
around his rear lot if his immediate neighbors did not object.
If the community was of the opinion that a substantial fence could be erected
on a common property line over the objection of an adjoining neighbor they could
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have amended Sec. 7.5. To date this has not been done or even attempted. The
permission requirement is still in the CC&Rs and now set forth to in all fence
design approvals of the architectural committee.
The appellees have furnished no legal reason why it should not be enforced.
The subsequently claimed dog issue is irrelevant to the applicability of CC&R 7.5.
On this appeal, it should be entitled to no recognition.
Under the foregoing circumstances, no triable issue of fact has been raised
by the defendants that would warrant a protracted and costly trial. The blatant
disregard of the known requirements should not be excused. It is also important,
that the enforceability of unambiguous CC&Rs, whose integrity hundreds of
communities, in Utah (and a multitude of other states), rely upon in governing the
workings of their associations, be preserved.
As stated in the Swenson and Crimmins cases, persons who own property in
a neighborhood subject to restrictive covenants are entitled to rely on them
according to their terms even if some of the neighbors no longer desire their
enforcement. CC&Rs constitute a contract and should be validated as such by the
courts.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of January, 2003

/^<^y

_

./George \>$ginsiein, Appellant Pro Se
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 3fl --day of January 2003,1 did personally
hand deliver two true and exact copies of the foregoing Apellant's Brief to Thomas
Howard, Esq. Attorney for Appellees, at 1725 Sidewinder Drive, Park City, Utah
84060.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE WEINSTEIN,
Plaintiff,

RULING AND ORDER

vs.

RONALD POPIEL and JAMIE
POPIEL,

Civil No, 010600143

Defendants.

Judge Robert K. Hilder

The parties cross Motions for Summary Judgment were argued to the court on May 6,
2002, Mr. Joseph E. Tesch appeared for plaintiff, and Mr. Thomas L. Howard appeared for
defendants. Following argument, the court took the matter under advisement Now, having
considered the memoranda, affidavits, the arguments of counsel and applicable law, the court
rules as follows:
First, the courtfindsthat the facts of the case have been fully developed, there are no
genuine disputes about any material facts, and summary judgment is appropriate. In fact, any
delay in resolving this matter would be a waste of the court's and the parties' resources, and it
would unnecessarily prolong an already protracted neighborhood dispute.
The relevant and established facts that control the court's decision include the following:
The parties live in the Ranch Place subdivision. Their properties adjoin each other, in part. All
properties and homeowners in Ranch Place are subject to Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions
("CC&Rs") which were in place when both parties bought their respective properties, and at all
times relevant to the dispute. Fencing of Ranch Place properties is subject to specific conditions
intheCC&Rs. Until 2000, neither property was fenced. Many properties in Ranch Place are
fenced, and many of the existing fences exceed the four foot height restriction. Few fences in the
parties' immediate neighborhood are fenced, and before Popiels' fenced their property,
approximately seven adjacent properties were unfenced and constituted de facto common ground
between and around the houses. The Popiels' fence complies with neighborhood standards, was
approved by the Homeowners1 Association ("HOA")> but it exceeds the height restriction by
approximately three to nine inches. The height is, however, consistent with the height of other
fences in the subdivision.
Popiels fenced their property for at least two reasons: to restrain and protect their
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surviving dog, after one dog was killed by an automobile, and to prevent Mr. Weinstein form
using their property to run his dog, Popiels did not obtain Mr. Weinstein's permission before
they erected a fence that ran just inside their property line, where it adjoins Mr. Weinstein's
property. The CC&Rs require that such permission be obtained. Mr. Weinstein withheld his
permission for at least two reasons: first, he relied on the use of Popiels' property to extend his
relatively small backyard to provide exercise and play for his dog, and he also cherished the
"common" ground which he believes benefitted not just him, but all adjoining property owners.
Mr. Weinstein claims he would never have bought his property if he had believed his neighbors
could erect an adjoining fence over his objections. Two other adjoining property owners have
given permission for the fence. There is a dispute whether Martins gave permission, but they
have since sold their property, and they have never filed a foimal complaint or joined this
lawsuit. Popiels did receive pre-approval for the fence from the HO A, but the approval letter
failed to refer to the need to obtain permission from neighbors, and Mr. Weinstein had no notice
of the construction until after it was accomplished
When Mr. Weinstein pursued his objection with the HOA, after construction was
complete, the HOA agreed that the approval letter lacked reference to the need for permission,
but the officers of the HOA indicated that they believed the approval requirement was a courtesy
provision, and not an absolute requirement. Because Mr. Weinstein persevered with his
objections, the HOA then conducted a variance procedure to determine if the Association
members were willing to grant a variance for the lack of permission. At the time of the meeting,
Mr. Weinstein had never objected to the excessive height of the fence, and the height was not at
issue. At the HOA meeting, homeowners in attendance voted 64 to zero in favor of the variance.
That is not the required absolute majority of all homeowners, but unrebutted evidence establishes
that when proxies were counted, the vote exceededfiftypercent Neither party presented
evidence that proxies are not valid with respect to a variance vote.
Based on the foregoing facts, and the conclusions of law set forth herein, the court finds
for defendants on certain alternative bases. First, the courtfindsthat the permission requirement
is not a mere courtesy requirement, but is a condition of the contract between the Association and
its members, and between the members themselves. Like all contractual conditions, obligations,
or covenants, it is subject to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As applied to a
restriction on a property owner's right to fence his or her property, the covenant requires that the
necessary permission not be unreasonably withheld. It may not be unreasonable to witlihold
fencing permission when a view is substantially impaired, or for other valid aesthetic reasons,
when the enjoyment of one's own property is impaired by the installation of a fence on a
neighboring property, but it is unreasonable to witlihold permission because the fence impairs the
use one wishes to make of the neighbors' property. That is, a use to which he has no right in law
or equity in the first place. The court is sympathetic to Mr, Weinstein's desire to maintain an
open and community use, with all the social and practical benefits that use implies, but the
Popiels' property is simply not common areaSecond, the court does not believe that the permission requirement is a design element
which would be subject to the variance procedure, but if it is the variance vote was valid and the
requirement will not be applied in this case. However, the variance procedure is important for

another reason. Mr. Weinstein did not object to the fence height until after the meeting, and the
court finds that he has waived his objection to the height, but in the alternative, if that issue
survives, the HOA vote, along with he existence of numerous fences that exceed the height
restriction, is persuasive evidence that the HOA and a majority of its members, have waived the
height requirement, both generally, and specifically as to the Popiels' fence.
Third, and the final alternative basis, the court finds that even if the permission
requirement and the height restriction are absolute, have not been waived, and no variance has
been validly granted, based on the clear evidence, no substantial right of Mr, Weinstein has been
impaired. His cognizable damages, if any, resultingfromthe installation and continued presence
of the fence are nominal; specifically, they amount to one dollar.
Based on the foregoing alternative determinations, both parties have prevailed to some
degree. Accordingly, the court hereby ORDERS that the fence may remain as installed, Mr.
Weinstein is awarded nominal damages of one dollar, and neither party is awarded attorney's
fees or costs. This signed Ruling and Order shall be the Order of the court and no further Order
is required.
DATED this 10lh day of May,2002,
By the Court:
/
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